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I
INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have witnessed a revolution to the extent government
statutes and agencies require employers and other institutions to ensure that their
policies and practices are nondiscriminatory. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964' proscribes discrimination in employment practices on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title IX of the Education Amendments of
19722 prohibits sex discrimination in education programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance.
These and related developments have spawned a vast amount of litigation and
regulation in a very short time. The budget for the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission grew from $3 million to $142 million between 1966 and 1981. In
1971, 3,970 civil rights cases were tried in the federal courts. By 1981, this number
increased to 13,750. Although the number of cases tried under Title VII is not
ascertainable, 41% of the civil rights cases filed in 1981 were brought under Title
VII.
This article illustrates the use of statistics to test for discrimination in employ-
ment practices. A fairly abstract discussion of the general problem is followed by a
series of examples that are restricted to promotion practices. Although the issues
discussed apply to many other aspects of employment, the discussion does not
extend to some important questions. For instance, should one use applicant flow or
external availability norms for comparison with the race or sex composition of new
hires? Further, what statistical tests are appropriate when the number of persons
affected by a particular practice is not fixed? One can easily imagine a fixed
number of slots into which persons might be promoted, but except for occasional
RIFs (reductions in force), firms do not have slots for terminations. Finally, this
article does not discuss the appropriate techniques for analyzing continuous events
(pay for example) which take on a range of outcomes, as opposed to binary events
(hiring, promotion, and termination) which either do or do not occur. Despite
Copyright © 1983 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Economist and data analyst at Welch Associates.
t President of Welch Associates; Professor of Economics, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981), amendedby General Accounting Office Personnel Act of
1980, § 8(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1980) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 1971,
1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
these limitations there are significant similarities between the tests for analyzing
promotion and other employment practices. Restricting the discussion to promo-
tion is sufficient for the points to be made in this article.
The last section discusses the natural tensions that arise between statistics, as
the pure application of laws of chance, and a litigation process which targets for
scrutiny only those practices which have disparate outcomes.
II
COMPARISONS BETWEEN GROUPS
Presumably the days of blatant discrimination, when only whites or men need
apply, are gone. Increasingly, the emphasis in fair employment litigation is on the
disparate effect of "patterns of practice." This is the area where statistics and
notions of chance variability emerge.
Inferences of discrimination always involve comparisons of two or more groups;
throughout this discussion only two groups are considered, one legislatively pro-
tected group which we call "black" and a reference nonprotected group which we
call "white." These groups might be women versus men, blacks or Hispanics
versus whites, or other numerous identifiable groups. There is always an employ-
ment practice at issue, such as promotion or pay, as well as a set of facts: higher
proportions of whites are promoted or whites receive higher average pay. These
facts, together with the number of blacks and whites involved, are the essential
elements of statistical tests.
If all whites were treated identically in terms of job characteristics, comparing
blacks to whites would be a simple matter. The two groups either would or would
not be identical. Ambiguity occurs because all whites are not treated the same;
some are more successful than others. Similarly, some blacks are more successful
than other blacks. Almost every black will be treated worse than some whites but
better than others; hence, this is where ideas of statistics or of chance become rele-
vant. The issue is whether there is a pattern favoring one group over another. We
begin by comparing averages (the facts). Is the proportion of whites who are suc-
cessful greater than the proportion of successful blacks? Normally, even in the
most evenhanded firm, success rates for blacks and whites will not be identical;
consequently, the next question becomes whether the observed difference is so
small that it may reasonably be attributed to chance. Developing an answer
requires information about the way chance differences occur.
Before examining the logical underpinnings of statistical tests, two issues
require clarification. First, the facts are almost always confounded with questions
of qualifications. Are the two groups equally qualified? In practical application,
this is often the key question. The nature of qualifications, the ways they can be
and are measured, the question of their relevance (are they really a sham?), and
the way qualifications are introduced into statistical computations are often cru-
cial. For illustrative purposes, however, qualifications can be ignored to highlight
the role of chance variability. We do not assume that all blacks and whites are
necessarily equally qualified. Rather, we assume that any particular randomly
selected white is as likely as any randomly .selected black to be the most qualified,
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or the next most qualified, and that this result is true as to all rankings down to the
least qualified. That is, we assume that group designation is irrelevant to rankings
based on qualifications.
The second issue to be clarified is the old truism that statistics prove nothing.
Regardless of the facts, a statistician cannot say with certainty that a firm either
does or does not discriminate. Statistics is like civil law in that it considers the
weight of the evidence. A statistician might comfortably say that if the XYZ com-
pany did not discriminate the observed facts would not be surprising, and on this
basis, the presumption of equal treatment "agrees" with the facts. Conversely, for
a company that did not discriminate the facts may be surprising, and if the facts
are very surprising, the presumption that the company does not discriminate may
be untenable to reasonable people. At issue is the conformability of the facts with
the presumption of nondiscrimination.
A. Testing for Discrimination in a Single Employment Practice
When qualifications can be ignored, nondiscrimination means only one thing:
group membership is irrelevant to chances of success. This establishes the basis for
all statistical tests of discrimination. For concreteness, assume an explicit set of
facts: one hundred employees were considered and fifty were promoted. Six of
twenty black employees were promoted and forty-four of eighty whites were pro-
moted; that is, 55% of the white employees and 30% of the black employees were
promoted. If blacks are as likely to be promoted as whites, would this pattern be
surprisingly disparate?
To answer this question, think of an experiment in which one takes 100 slips of
paper, writes "promoted" on fifty of them, "not promoted" on the other fifty, thor-
oughly mixes them in a hat and has a blindfolded referee draw twenty. These
twenty slips are "pseudo-blacks" and the remaining eighty are "pseudo-whites."
Calculate the proportion of slips in each of these two groups that say "promoted."
The observed black and white promotion rates in this company differ by 25%.
After selecting the samples of 20 and 80 slips of paper and calculating the propor-
tion of promotion successes of pseudo-blacks and pseudo-whites, two questions are
asked: do the success rates of the two pseudo-groups differ by 25% or more and
does the difference favor pseudo-whites by as much as 25%?
The slips are again placed in the hat, mixed, drawn, and the answers to these
two questions are recorded. After a large number of repetitions, the fraction of
yes's for the two questions is counted. The results should show that the first ques-
tion is answered "yes" approximately twice as often as the second.
These two proportions, the fractions of yes's, are the essential ingredients of
statistical tests. The first is known as a two-tailed or unsigned test which measures
the difference in success rates irrespective of whether the pseudo-whites or pseudo-
blacks are favored. The second, a one-tailed test, counts cases when only the
pseudo-whites are favored. The first proportion is used for tests of inequality while
the second is used when the nature of the inequality is also at issue. For present
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purposes, we concentrate only on the first.3 Next, a criterion is needed for deter-
mining whether the observed 25% differential is statistically significant. Assume
that the random selection process was such that 80% of the draws resulted in a
differential that was as large or larger than 25%. In this event, if treatment were
colorblind, one expects to see a difference as large as the one that actually occurred
four times in five. The observed differential would be unsurprising. If the trial
differentials exceeded 25% only one time in five, the observed differential would be
larger than average, but not uncommon. Alternatively, if the repetitive sampling
process yields a difference as large as 25% only once in a thousand, the observed
difference would be surprising if blacks and whites truly had equal chances of
promotion.
The process of mixing and drawing is tedious and unnecessary since the laws of
chance governing such processes are known. Statisticians, if given the facts
described, would simply use this information and the appropriate formulas to do
one of two things: either compute the exact probability of a difference between
groups as large as 25% based on a hypothetical process, or appeal to approxima-
tions known to be adequate in such cases where differences in success rates follow
normal or bell curve distributions. Whatever the mechanics, the conceptual exper-
iment is the same: contrast what is-the observed difference-with what would
occur from chance if group membership were irrelevant to chances for success.
The first step in the statistical test is to introduce an hypothesis on which
probability statements are made. For analyses of discrimination, the hypothesis is
that protected groups (blacks) are treated the same as the reference group (whites).
The next step is to use the observed difference, 25% in the above example, to com-
pute the probability that as large a difference could have occurred if the two
groups in fact had equal promotion chances. The third step requires interpreta-
tion of results. If the computed chance probability is so low that equal treatment
is implausible, then factors other than chance were probably involved.
How low is low? If the probability computed under the null or equal treat-
ment hypothesis is below 0.05 then the observed differential is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. This "critical value" is frequently used by scientists. In large
number cases it is equivalent to the two standard deviation rule alluded to in
United Slates v. Hazelwood School District4 and many subsequent cases.
It is important to recognize that the 0.05 rule does not say that when a differ-
ence as large as two standard deviations occurs the probability that the two groups
are treated equally is 5% or less, nor does it say that the probability of unequal
treatment is 95% or more. It only says that if the two groups are treated equally,
one would expect a difference as large as the one observed 5% of the time. One
presumes that the groups either are or are not treated equally. The choice of a
critical value represents a convention that describes the chance that the "weight of
the evidence" will be viewed as damning of a nondiscriminating employer. It is
obvious that a conservative rule, one with a smaller critical value, carries both
3. The courts appear to favor a two-tailed over a one-tailed test, but to the authors' knowledge, the
courts have never explicitly addressed the issue of which is appropriate.
4. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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greater risks of conclusions of insignificant difference when treatment is truly dis-
parate and smaller risks of convicting innocent parties. This tradeoff accompanies
all judgments when uncertainty persists.
B. Testing for Discrimination in Several Employment Practices
The above discussion describes tests for discrimination in a single employment
practice. When multiple practices are contested, that procedure should not be
followed repetitively as though each of the tests being conducted was analyzing an
isolated event.
Although ideas of multiple tests are beyond the scope of this article, the central
issue can be illustrated by a simple example. If one were to toss fifty dimes and
thirty landed heads, that result in isolation might not be surprising. If one were to
toss fifty dimes and fifty quarters, it would be less surprising to find that one of the
two sets of tosses resulted in thirty heads. If one were to toss fifty dimes and fifty
quarters it would be more surprising to discover that both resulted in thirty heads.
If the 0.05 rule were applied separately to two independent employment prac-
tices in tests for discrimination, the chance that one of the two would fail-even
with neutral treatment-is about 0.10. In fact, if the 0.05 rule were applied to
fourteen independent practices, the chance is about 50-50 that one or more would
fail, even with neutral treatment.
If a firm's employment practices are neutral with respect to group membership,
random chance will result in some practices which produce disparities in outcomes
to the detriment of a given group, while other practices produce disparities to that
group's benefit. An overall evaluation of a firm's practices requires a broad view
that considers the complete range of observed outcomes. The preceding para-
graph demonstrates that an individual, statistically significant disparity to the dis-
advantage of a particular group may not be statistically surprising within the
context of a broader view, if the set of practices under scrutiny includes other
outcomes that favor the same group of employees. One expects an equal number
of favorable and unfavorable outcomes, some of which may appear extreme if
viewed in isolation. Conversely, a set of outcomes that are unsurprising individu-
ally may lead to inferences of statistical significance if viewed jointly. If every one
of a large number of independent employment practices produces a small disparity
to the detriment of a particular group, the weight of the evidence may be sufficient
for a statistician to pronounce the set of observed outcomes as collectively unlikely
to be attributable to chance. A set of practices is jointly significant if the observed
pattern of outcomes is not consistent with group-neutral behavior by the firm. A
large individual disparity may not be surprising; a set of small disparities that are
all to the detriment of the same group may be very surprising.
III
PROMOTIONS
This section works through an extended example of tests for discrimination
between two groups in a hypothetical firm, Ajax Computer Games. Although the
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logic of the calculation of chance probabilities remains that of conceptual experi-
ments when group membership is randomly determined, this example will show
that the context in which promotions occur can affect calculations of chance
probabilities used in tests. A point that is frequently misunderstood is also illus-
trated; namely, in adjusting for factors which may be correlated with qualifica-
tions and are correlated with group membership, the adjustment does not
necessarily result in inferences of less significant differentials between the two
groups.
The first context assumes that promotions occur to fill a fixed number of
vacancies. This assumption might be true if promotions were to managerial or
supervisory positions where it is known in advance that vacancies exist and will be
filled. The conceptual experiment for such cases is a race where one's chances of
winning depend on the qualifications of all contestants. The alternative context
involves cases where promotion depends only on one's own qualifications. This
would include proficiency promotions where a specified level of competence guar-
antees advancement. Mixed contexts where the best are selected only if they satisfy
minimal requirements are not discussed.
The first hypothetical can be presented in the following way:
TABLE I
AJAX EMPLOYEES
Not
Promoted Promoted Total
Whites 71 109 180
Blacks 14 66 80
All 85 175 260
In this table, the first row refers to white candidates and the second row refers to
black candidates. The first column refers to successful candidates, and the second
refers to unsuccessful candidates. Thus of 180 white employees, 71 were promoted
and 109 were not, a success rate of 39.4%. The corresponding figures for black
employees show that 14 were promoted, 66 were not, giving a success rate of 17.5%
among the 80 black candidates. The bottom row indicates that overall 85 of 260
employees were promoted. This presentation is what statisticians refer to as a 2 x 2
contingency table, meaning two groups (blacks and whites) and two outcomes
(promoted and not promoted).
The null hypothesis of equal chances for promotion success, which is used to
test whether the difference in promotion rates (17.5% for blacks and 39.4% for
whites) is statistically significant, is that a randomly selected black candidate has
an even chance to be more qualified than a randomly selected white candidate,
and vice versa. Since blacks account for 30.8% (80 of 260) of all candidates, the
probability that the most qualified candidate is black is 0.308. This probability is
also the chance that the least qualified candidate is black.
The first context of a fixed number of promotion slots refers to a conceptual
experiment in which all candidates are ranked and the best 85 are chosen. The
process can be thought of as though the 260 candidates are examined to select the
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best, the remaining 259 are then examined to select the second best, and this pro-
cedure is continued until all the promotion.slots are filled. This process of selecting
one candidate and then selecting a second from the remaining pool is called sam-
pling without replacement. If the two groups are equally qualified, then the
chance probabilities associated with contingency tables like the one depicted
above follow the hypergeometric distribution.
The second context of selecting all those who are qualified refers to a somewhat
different conceptual experiment in which only a candidate's own qualifications
matter; that is, the qualifications of other candidates are irrelevant. Each candi-
date is examined and either passes or fails, independently of the number of other
candidates who pass or fail. The process is considered as though the 80 black
candidates are themselves each a random draw from a super group. Either the
super group is so large that selecting any number up to a maximum of 80 does not
measurably alter the chance that the next chosen will pass, or each of the 80 drawn
is replaced before the next is selected. What matters is that each of the 80 has an
equal chance of passing the evaluation. In such a case, the number passing among
the 80 drawn follows the binomial distribution. Similarly, each of the 180 whites is
viewed as drawn from a super group and each has an equal chance of passing.
The number who pass among the 180 drawn is again presumed to follow the
binomial.
The null hypothesis of equal promotion chance is the same as assuming that
the two super groups are one. In this case, the probability of observing a partic-
ular set of facts-14 of 80 blacks are promoted versus 71 of 180 whites-depends
on something that is unknown, the chance of promotion within the super group.
Strictly speaking, statisticians cannot calculate true chance probabilities in such
cases. But if we are willing to add one fact, that 85 of the 260 total draws pass the
evaluation, this unknown probability -does not affect calculations.5 This process,
known as conditioning on the full result, gives an identical calculation for the two
contexts.
The fact that context does not matter for the simple 2 x 2 comparison can be
examined by assuming that the 260 candidates are lined up in rank order of quali-
fications. If the difference between passing and not passing is the same as for being
in the top 85 versus the bottom 175, then context is irrelevant. In a single event,
when the competition is fixed, it does not matter whether the context is that of
selecting the best, however many, or of selecting only those who surpass some
hypothetical norm. It would indeed matter if the 85 promotions were viewed as a
series of contests, each consisting of a smaller number of contestants.
Given only the facts of Table 1, the chi-square statistic is appropriate for
testing the neutrality of Ajax promotions. The probability of observing a disparity
as large as 17.5% versus 39.4% is only 5 in 10,000 (0.0005), much less than the 5 in
100 (0.05) generally regarded as indicating statistical significance. Thus, on the
5. The null hypothesis that the chances of success in the super groups are equal seemingly makes this a
fairly innocuous assumption, and it is almost always so viewed. There are exceptions, however, and dif-
ferent techniques based on Bayes Law are sometimes used. See A. ZELLNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO BAYE-
SIAN INFERENCE IN ECONOMETRICS 10-Il (1971).
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basis of the facts presented in Table 1, it is highly unlikely that chance alone
resulted in the observed black/white differential.
The preceding discussion and test assumed that the distribution of job relevant
attributes is the same for each group. If this is not the case, any available informa-
tion on qualifications should be incorporated so that valid inferences can be made
regarding the relationship between group membership and the employment prac-
tice under scrutiny.
For simplicity, assume that the probability of being promoted depends on how
long one has been employed. Some promotions occur during a person's first year,
but most are reserved for those with greater seniority. This factor may help to
explain the racial discrepancy in promotion rates if whites are less likely than
blacks to be in their first year of employment. Controlling for a factor in which the
groups being compared differ, such as seniority, will not help to explain differences
in outcomes between groups unless they help explain differences in outcomes wi/hm
groups. For example, even if the black employees in a firm have less seniority on
average than white employees, including seniority as a control factor will not elim-
inate the measured effect of race on promotion probability unless differences in
seniority help to explain why some whites are promoted and others are not, or why
some blacks are promoted and others are not. This can be best demonstrated by
returning to our example.
First, assume that dividing Ajax's candidate pool into high and low seniority
generates the following pair of tables.
TABLE 2
AJAX EMPLOYEES BY SENIORITY
A. High Seniority
Whites
Blacks
Promoted
47
4
Not
Promoted
68
16
Total
115
2o
All 51 84 135
B. Low Seniority
Not
Promoted Promoted Total
Whites 24 41 65
Blacks 10 50 60
All 34 91 125
Note that 115 of the 180 white machinists, or 63.9%, are in the high seniority
class compared to only 20 of 80 blacks (25.0%).6 Note also that promotions are
6. This fact raises the following question: why do white machinists have more seniority than black
machinists? It may be that blacks in this firm are more likely to be terminated during their first year than
are whites, so that a smaller proportion of blacks than whites ever reach the high seniority category. Alter-
natively, it may be that this firm has recently instituted an affirmative hiring policy, so that many of its
recent hires (persons with low seniority) are black.
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more common among those with high seniority (37.8% of the high seniority group
is promoted versus 27.2% for the low seniority group).
In this context, controlling for seniority implies that separate comparisons be
made between high experience whites and blacks and between low seniority whites
and blacks. This differentiation addresses the question whether whites and blacks
with similar amounts of experience have similar chances of being promoted. If so,
then the large unadjusted disparity in success rates is attributable to experience,
rather than to race.
The table for high seniority shows that 47 of 115 whites and 4 of 20 blacks
received promotions to supervisor. These numbers translate into success rates of
0.409 for whites and 0.200 for blacks. Among employees in their first year, 24 of 65
whites and 10 of 60 blacks were promoted. The corresponding success proportions
are 0.369 for whites and 0.167 for blacks.
Whites on average are more experienced than blacks and a larger proportion of
those with high seniority are promoted. However, among whites alone, the success
rates of high and low seniority machinists are similar (0.409 and 0.369, respec-
tively). The success rates among high and low seniority blacks are 0.200 and 0.167.
Although the probability of promotion for a white or a black increases with sen-
iority, this alone is too weak an explanation for the large unadjusted disparity
between white and black success rates.7 In this example, the disparity in unad-
justed success proportions is not attributable to seniority, and, after a control for
seniority is made, the disparity in promotion rates remains statistically significant.
Next, consider an alternative example. Again the candidates are divided into
those with high and low seniority, but now the resultant contingency tables are as
follows:
TABLE 3
AJAX EMPLOYEES BY SENIORITY
A. High Seniority
Not
Promoted Promoted Total
Whites 64 51 115
Blacks 9 11 20
All 73 62 135
B. Low Seniority
Not
Promoted Promoted Total
Whites 7 58 65
Blacks 5 55 60
All 12 113 125
7. In this example, the difference in success rates of high and low seniority employees would occur by
chance (assuming a seniority-neutral promotion policy) approximately 7 times in 100 (0.07). Thus, sen-
iority is not a statistically significant factor in determining promotion success.
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These tables are similar to the preceding pair in several ways.8 The number of
whites and blacks within each seniority category remains the same. As in the pre-
vious case, whites are both more likely to be experienced and more likely to be
promoted than are blacks, and, on average, those with more seniority are more
likely to be promoted.
The two pairs of tables differ in one significant respect. In this second example,
seniority is closely related to promotion probability wzihzn race. Among whites,
the success rates for high and low seniority are 0.557 and 0.108, respectively. For
blacks, the corresponding rates are 0.450 and 0.083. There are much greater dif-
ferences between persons of the same race but different seniority level than
between persons of different race but the same seniority level. The disparity in
unadjusted success proportions is attributable to the large differences in seniority
between white and black candidates. The remaining differential between white
and black success rates is not statistically significant.
This discussion assumes that each employee's seniority is known with certainty.
In practical application, some of the information deemed necessary to properly
differentiate among employees' qualifications may be incomplete or inaccurate. In
such cases, controlling for factors which are legitimate predictors of promotion
success may fail to eliminate an observed disparity in outcomes even if the firm is
behaving in a neutral manner. The ability of control factors to eliminate a dis-
parity is limited by the accuracy with which these factors are measured and
recorded. Errors in data tend to mask the relationship between qualification and
success; if qualifications seem not to matter, group membership remains as a statis-
tically significant predictor of success. Thus, data inaccuracies are generally to the
advantage of plaintiffs.
Before returning briefly to the issue of adjusting for potentially confounding
characteristics, reconsider the question of context. The discussion to this point
assumes that the 85 promotions occurred on the same day. More often than not,
one analyzes the outcome of a firm's employment practices over a relatively pro-
longed period of time. For practices like promotion, there is a legitimate question
concerning the construction of eligibility pools.
Again, assume that the distribution of qualifications is the same among blacks
and whites. Ajax's promotions, however, occurred on as many as 85 different days.
How does this alter the methodology for comparing the two groups' relative suc-
cess rates?
Unlike the presumption surrounding the discussion of Table 1, where context
did not matter, in this situation the choice of approach depends on whether pro-
motions occur to fill fixed openings or in response to candidates surpassing some
qualification criterion. Passing a fixed criterion is a contest, but the contestants
are not well specified. Suppose that the pass/fail outcome is based on a test where
one passes if the score achieved exceeds a specified cutoff. When a test is adminis-
tered to different people on different days, there is little if any significance to
whether those taking the test were predominately white or predominantly black on
8. See supra Table 2, at 178.
[Vol. 46: No. 4
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
a particular day. If the issue is the test's group neutrality, the appropriate proce-
dure is to add the results of all tests to produce a description of the overall out-
come. The 2 x 2 contingency given in Table 1 exemplifies this procedure.
Alternatively, assume that promotions are awarded to fill a fixed number of
slots, with Ajax attempting to promote the most qualified candidate available
whenever an opening occurs. Now, the fact whether all promotions occur on the
same day or occur on different days from different eligibility pools becomes rele-
vant. Aggregating the individual pools to form a single result leads to an incorrect
statistical inference.
Assume that Ajax's total of 85 promotions to supervisor occurred on 85 dif-
ferent days, perhaps spread out over a long period of time. On 71 of these days,
the person promoted was chosen from a pool of candidates all of whom are white.
On the remaining 14 days when supervisory openings occurred, all machinists, and
hence all candidates for promotions, were black. In this admittedly extreme
example, the racial composition of persons promoted would be beyond the control
of Ajax. 9 Ajax would have had to promote 71 whites and 14 blacks. No charge of
racial discrimination in promotion would be possible.
As this example illustrates, variation in the race composition across eligibility
pools changes the probability of observing an extreme race composition among
persons promoted. Calculating an average composition and assuming that all pro-
motions are drawn from pools with that average is incorrect. The appropriate
procedure is to calculate the probability of observing an outcome at least as
extreme as the one observed, given the composition of each individual pool. If
blacks and whites are individually equally likely to be the most qualified, this
probability is the fraction of persons in the pool who are black. For example, if 14
blacks were promoted in 85 trials, one would calculate the probability of observing
14 or fewer black promotions given the racial composition of each individual eligi-
bility pool. The probability of observing exactly 14 blacks among the successful
candidates equals the probability of blacks being promoted from the first 14 pools
and none thereafter, plus the probability of blacks being promoted from the first
13 pools and the 15th, but no other, and so on for every possible split of the 85
pools into 14 and 71.10 Similarly, one would calculate the probability of exactly
13, 12, 11, 10, . . . 1, and zero black promotions, the outcomes even more extreme
than the observed 14. The sum of these probabilities is used for a one-tailed test.
The practical import of such a calculation is to increase the statistical signifi-
cance of an observed disparity between two groups. To illustrate this point, sup-
pose that two promotions occur on two separate days and that on the first day 90%
of those eligible are black, whereas on the second day only 10% are black. The
expectation is that one black is to be promoted just as it would be if one-half of the
eligibles were black each day. Still, there is greater confidence that a black will be
9. This result presumes that Ajax could not effect the time of supervisory openings. In practical appli-
cation, one may want to test for neutrality in timing as well as neutrality given timing.
10. Such calculations are cumbersome and often impractical to do so by hand, but they are readily
programmed on a high speed computer. Alternatively, when the number of promotions is large, approxi-
mate statistics can be used.
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promoted when the pool is 90% black and that a black will not be promoted when
the pool is 10% black, than there would be if the pools were always 50-50. With
the two 90-10 mixtures, the probability that exactly one black is promoted is 0.82,
whereas the probability would be 0.50 if both pools were 50-50. The promotion
process leaves less room for chance when the composition of pools varies than
when the composition is stable.
In the previous discussion of seniority, the division of Ajax employees into high
and low seniority groups was arbitrary. A more reasonable approach would be to
assume that seniority affects chances of promotion in a more continuous way than
in this simple high-low dichotomy. There is a family of techniques which are
loosely called regressions that can be used to estimate effects of many factors,
including seniority and race or sex, on the outcome being analyzed. "Ordinary
least squares" is the most common statistical technique used in litigation, but for
EEO matters this technique is usually restricted to analysis of pay. For binary
events such as promotion, related techniques are used.
One such appealing technique is probit; the idea underlying this analytical
scheme is a cutoff that distinguishes between true and false, pass and fail, and
other similar outcomes. The standard probit is designed for situations in which an
individual's chances for success are related solely to his or her own characteristics.
This procedure is well suited for studying a single event or for studying cases in the
proficiency cutoff context. Probit is not directly applicable to cases in which a
fixed number of promotion slots are filled by the best candidates available on a
particular day. In such cases, each individual's characteristics must be compared
to the characteristics of all of that day's contestants. Someone who is likely to win
one contest may be unlikely to win another, not because the person is different, but
because the competition is stronger.
To our knowledge, techniques employing this broader view of contests have
not been used in litigation, but the introduction of such analytical tools is perhaps
only a matter of time.
IV
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has attempted to provide an intuitive feel for the
logical underpinnings of statistical tests used in EEO litigation. It has also tried to
illustrate that the contexts in which real world data are produced can importantly
affect the tests used. In doing so, issues of correcting for potentially confounding
factors have received only cursory treatment.
The authors' experience in these matters is fairly extensive and leaves the
impression that differences which emerge in statistical perspective during litigation
are more often the product of incomplete and faulty data or of something less than
careful scrutiny of the data, than of differences in statistical philosophy. To the
extent that philosophical differences occur, they most often focus on issues
involving the legitimacy of controlling for factors such as education or credentials
that may be viewed either as the vehicle through which discrimination operates or
as crucial determinants of productivity. For hiring studies, there are often legiti-
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mate questions concerning the choice of a norm: should applicant flow or external
availability be used, and, if external availability is appropriate, how is the scope of
the market to be defined? These are not unimportant issues. They are, however,
issues for another day.
Hopefully, the restriction of scope to promotion has not given the impression
that analyses of other employment practices are either not equally rich or are fully
redundant. For some purposes, studies of promotion are the simplest and the most
straightforward. Promotions were selected as illustrative because they are condu-
cive to the central points of this discussion.
In closing, there is an issue surrounding litigation in general, and EEO litiga-
tion in particular, that can be addressed neither by reference to a single employ-
ment practice nor by examination of a set of practices. This issue is the dynamics
of litigation: the way that cases are selected for filing, the winnowing process that
accompanies the steps through class certification, the resolutions of motions for
summary judgment that trim away parts of a case and, barring settlement, the
restricted issues finally addressed at trial.
The fundamental idea of statistical tests is that differences emerge by chance in
neutral environments. The section on comparisons between groups briefly dis-
cussed methods for simultaneously testing more than one statistical hypothesis.
Recall that if an employer engages in as many as fourteen independent employ-
ment practices, each with a 0.95 probability of producing an insignificant disparity
(under the 0.05 rule), the chances are better than 50-50 that at least one practice
will result in a statistically significant disparity due solely to random chance.
Thus, analysis of an individual practice in isolation can lead to a mistaken infer-
ence of discrimination if the practice that is scrutinized is chosen because it
presents the statistics that are least favorable to an employer.
This selection of the most unflattering practices for analysis is exactly what
happens in many EEO law suits. The process begins when plaintiffs file charges
and continues through the search for attorneys willing to assume part of the risk.
Initially, a suit may charge a company with discrimination in a wide range of
areas (hiring, placement, promotion, pay, discipline, termination, etc.). However,
once plaintiffs have possession of the data necessary to assess the validity of such
charges, they may withdraw complaints against practices which clearly show no
disparity, and, if plaintiffs do not withdraw these complaints, defense attorneys are
able to file for summary judgment to dismiss areas where differences seemingly do
not arise.
There are obvious economies to be realized from reducing the scope of a case,
both for plaintiffs and defendants. From a statistical perspective, however, such a
procedure may be counter to correct inference. Statistical tests and their associ-
ated significance levels are predicated on the notion of randomness. Criteria for
assessing statistical significance that would be correct if applied to a practice
chosen at random are overly severe if applied to a practice chosen because it is
atypically unfavorable to the defendant. Judging a company's guilt or innocence
based on its statistically most damning employment practice is similar to esti-
mating a family's average height by measuring its tallest member.
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This reduction in the scope of the case has at least two ramifications. First,
although narrowing the class to persons affected by only a subset of an employer's
practices is likely to reduce the maximum award for which the employer might be
held liable, it also allows attention to be focused only on those practices which
produce the most unfavorable statistics. Again, it would be statistically surprising
if a large employer comprised of many partially autonomous departments, each
behaving neutrally toward persons of different race, sex, or ethnicity, did not
include some practices which produce unfavorable statistics even in the absence of
discrimination. Second, given that an innocent employer may be statistically
guilty somewhere in its operation, it behooves one to monitor each employment
practice by department to avoid even the appearance of discriminatory policies.
The information needed to allow such ongoing monitoring of EEO performance
should be generated and analyzed regularly, as a matter of course, before a law
suit is filed.
Executive Order 11,246 added affirmative action to our vocabulary, requiring
that federal contractors "take affirmative action to eliminate the continuing effects
of past discrimination."'" This directive is anything but *a request for neutral,
(color- or sex-blind) treatment. Rather, it is a mandate that cognizance of race,
sex, and ethnicity be taken to ensure equal treatment. Leaving matters to chance
is not a good business practice for federal contractors. Given the dynamics of liti-
gation, it also is not good business practice for noncontractors.
11. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1965).
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